

Troubled Assets – Market Update (Fall 2010)



Reznick and Ballard Spahr

Forum on Work-Out and Recapitalization Strategies

**Los Angeles, CA
November 3, 2010**

Pipeline Built Rapidly with Slow Resolution Pace


Steady stream of troubled assets in past year, with monthly average of \$10B. Notably, resolutions starting to build, but new stress from CMBS loans (at 72% of 2010 additions).



Source: Real Capital Analytics, Troubled Asset Report April 5, 2010

Scope of Troubled Assets

Total distressed assets have reached \$157B, with additional \$65B already resolved. Retail, office and apartments appear most problematic.




Source: Real Capital Analytics, Troubled Asset Report April 5, 2010; Bubbles sized to relative distress value

www.rcanalytics.com

CMBS: Delinquencies, Foreclosures, REO Building

CMBS represents approx. 40% of distressed market, with pipeline building from increased 90+ day delinquencies that are bleeding over into heavy foreclosure and REO activity.

Chart 6 – Monthly Delinquency Categories (source: Realpoint)




Source: RealPoint Monthly Delinquency Report 0 October 2010


CMBS Specially Serviced Loans - Composition

76% of the \$73B in specially serviced loans involve retail, multi-family, and office; overall, 11.7% of all CMBS loans by balance are in specially serviced status

Special Servicing Summary (% by Balance)



Specially Serviced Loans by Property Type



| Property Type | # of Loans | % in Spec Serv by Count | Aggregate Balance | % in Spec Serv by Balance | Max Loan Size | Avg Loan Size | % of Total Prop Type Balance in Spec Serv | Prop Type as % of Entire Universe | Ratio |
|---------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|------------------|----------------------|---|-----------------------------------|-------------|
| Office | 973 | 21.5% | \$ 20,760,474,997 | 28.3% | \$ 775,000,000 | \$ 21,336,562 | 10.8% | 30.7% | 0.92 |
| Multifamily | 1,056 | 23.3% | \$ 17,518,323,790 | 23.9% | \$ 1,500,000,000 | \$ 16,589,322 | 17.9% | 15.6% | 1.53 |
| Retail | 1,391 | 30.7% | \$ 17,090,635,581 | 23.3% | \$ 305,000,000 | \$ 12,286,582 | 8.8% | 30.9% | 0.75 |
| Lodging | 455 | 10.0% | \$ 9,421,035,970 | 12.8% | \$ 412,701,271 | \$ 20,705,574 | 19.0% | 7.9% | 1.62 |
| Other | 362 | 8.0% | \$ 6,121,875,178 | 8.3% | \$ 414,000,000 | \$ 16,911,257 | 10.0% | 9.7% | 0.86 |
| Industrial | 293 | 6.5% | \$ 2,449,369,679 | 3.3% | \$ 89,000,000 | \$ 8,359,623 | 7.6% | 5.2% | 0.65 |
| Total | 4,530 | 100.0% | \$ 73,361,715,195 | 100.0% | | \$ 16,194,639 | 11.7% | 100.0% | 1.00 |

Source: JP Morgan Research: Monthly Fixed Rate Special Servicing Analysis dated October 25, 2010

CMBS Specially Serviced Loan Trends

CMBS loans have deteriorated noticeably in past 12-18 months with specially serviced assets at 11.7% of conduit universe

Special Servicing Analysis for Fixed-Rate CMBS Universe

October 25, 2010

CMBS Research
As of September 2010

J.P.Morgan

| | As of 10/22 | 1 month | 6 months | 12 months |
|----------------------------------|-------------|---------|----------|-----------|
| # of Loans in Special Servicing: | 4,530 | + 80 | + 202 | + 1,254 |
| # of Loans Outstanding: | 54,794 | - 392 | - 2,716 | - 4,274 |
| % of Loans in Special Servicing: | 8.27% | + 20 bp | + 74 bp | + 272 bp |

| Deal Vintage | # of Deals | Total # of Deals | % by Count | # of Loans | Aggregate Balance | % by Balance | % of Vintage (by Balance) |
|--------------|------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1996 | 4 | 9 | 44.4% | 8 | \$ 35,874,939 | 0.0% | 8.6% |
| 1997 | 11 | 21 | 52.4% | 20 | \$ 50,491,287 | 0.1% | 2.8% |
| 1998 | 26 | 31 | 83.9% | 98 | \$ 665,979,765 | 0.9% | 12.1% |
| 1999 | 34 | 38 | 89.5% | 175 | \$ 972,839,757 | 1.3% | 22.1% |
| 2000 | 32 | 33 | 97.0% | 321 | \$ 1,786,689,504 | 2.4% | 44.4% |
| 2001 | 34 | 35 | 97.1% | 235 | \$ 1,825,176,126 | 2.2% | 7.5% |
| 2002 | 34 | 36 | 94.4% | 135 | \$ 1,024,832,352 | 1.4% | 4.0% |
| 2003 | 44 | 47 | 93.6% | 190 | \$ 2,014,700,849 | 2.7% | 5.3% |
| 2004 | 59 | 59 | 100.0% | 343 | \$ 3,912,937,737 | 5.3% | 8.9% |
| 2005 | 62 | 62 | 100.0% | 747 | \$ 12,432,037,188 | 16.9% | 10.7% |
| 2006 | 62 | 62 | 100.0% | 1,053 | \$ 15,740,155,907 | 22.8% | 10.8% |
| 2007 | 56 | 58 | 100.0% | 1,128 | \$ 30,750,298,059 | 41.9% | 16.6% |
| 2008 | 8 | 8 | 100.0% | 77 | \$ 1,349,601,725 | 1.8% | 12.9% |
| Total | 468 | 499 | 93.8% | 4,530 | \$ 73,361,715,195 | 100.0% | 11.7% |


| Delinquency Status | # of Loans | Aggregate Balance | % by Balance | % by Count |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Current | 225 | \$ 9,861,013,812 | 13.4% | 5.0% |
| Grace/Not Yet Due | 205 | \$ 4,377,068,967 | 6.0% | 4.5% |
| <1 Month | 228 | \$ 5,193,503,619 | 7.1% | 5.0% |
| 30 Days | 175 | \$ 3,160,249,340 | 4.3% | 3.9% |
| 60 Days | 164 | \$ 3,123,703,696 | 4.3% | 3.6% |
| 90+ Days | 1,357 | \$ 17,984,571,805 | 24.5% | 30.0% |
| Foreclosure | 1,167 | \$ 18,396,373,311 | 25.1% | 25.8% |
| REO | 647 | \$ 6,936,631,357 | 9.5% | 14.3% |
| Performing Matured | 34 | \$ 698,284,396 | 1.0% | 0.8% |
| Non-Performing Matured | 328 | \$ 3,630,314,892 | 4.9% | 7.2% |
| Total | 4,530 | \$ 73,361,715,195 | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Source: JP Morgan Research: Monthly Fixed Rate Special Servicing Analysis dated October 25, 2010


Deal Vintage Matters

CMBS conduit collateral is deteriorating at a historically fast pace, with 2005-2007 vintage loans materially underperforming other vintages, notably due to I/O loans

Special Servicing Universe by Deal Vintage




Special Servicing Universe by Deal Vintage



Source: J.P. Morgan, Trepp

Breakdown of Specially Serviced Loans by Loan Type



Source: JP Morgan Research: Monthly Fixed Rate Special Servicing Analysis dated October 25, 2010

CMBS Special Servicers - Concentration

Top five CMBS special servicers account for nearly 88% of the market, and exhibit varying degrees of aggressiveness towards foreclosure


Breakdown of Specially Serviced Loans by Special Servicer:

| Special Servicer | # of Loans | Balance of Loans | % by Balance | Delinquency Status | | | | | | | Non-Performing Matured | Performing Matured | Total |
|------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|---------------|--------------------|---------|---------|----------|---------|--------|-------|------------------------|--------------------|-------|
| | | | | Current | 30 Days | 60 Days | 90+ Days | FC/REO | | | | | |
| LNR Partners, Inc. | 1,280 | \$ 23,673,386,000 | 32.3% | 31.42% | 5.18% | 2.66% | 26.69% | 26.13% | 6.84% | 1.08% | 100% | | |
| CWC Capital Asset Management | 954 | \$ 18,165,218,366 | 24.8% | 16.34% | 5.93% | 2.48% | 12.35% | 60.40% | 2.38% | 0.12% | 100% | | |
| C-III Asset Management LLC | 656 | \$ 8,986,192,113 | 12.2% | 23.55% | 1.16% | 9.98% | 21.60% | 39.50% | 3.61% | 0.60% | 100% | | |
| Midland | 515 | \$ 8,501,869,782 | 11.6% | 32.45% | 6.87% | 4.96% | 40.09% | 9.27% | 4.63% | 1.72% | 100% | | |
| JE Roberts | 322 | \$ 5,313,933,577 | 7.2% | 29.61% | 1.85% | 6.40% | 22.97% | 32.16% | 5.56% | 1.44% | 100% | | |
| Helios AMC, LLC | 203 | \$ 3,518,735,370 | 4.8% | 38.68% | 3.93% | 6.62% | 27.54% | 18.69% | 4.52% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| ING Clarion Partners, LLC | 162 | \$ 2,226,438,546 | 3.0% | 16.11% | 1.45% | 2.68% | 62.16% | 5.20% | 7.04% | 5.36% | 100% | | |
| Berkadia | 294 | \$ 1,881,332,136 | 2.6% | 25.26% | 2.14% | 0.82% | 10.86% | 52.63% | 7.37% | 0.92% | 100% | | |
| Orix | 96 | \$ 770,153,635 | 1.0% | 19.48% | 0.58% | 1.11% | 23.74% | 41.64% | 12.43% | 1.03% | 100% | | |
| NCB, FSB | 10 | \$ 171,507,566 | 0.2% | 16.34% | 0.00% | 43.00% | 38.96% | 1.70% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| GMAC | 19 | \$ 49,364,643 | 0.1% | 4.25% | 0.00% | 3.32% | 30.78% | 61.65% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| Prudential | 3 | \$ 54,307,023 | 0.1% | 92.86% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 7.14% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| Wells Fargo | 7 | \$ 21,948,753 | 0.0% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 58.64% | 0.00% | 41.36% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| GE Capital | 3 | \$ 14,700,572 | 0.0% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 63.84% | 0.00% | 36.16% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| Lend Lease | 5 | \$ 7,688,725 | 0.0% | 62.65% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 13.95% | 23.40% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| KeyBank | 1 | \$ 4,998,227 | 0.0% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 100.00% | 0.00% | 0.00% | 100% | | |
| Total | 4,530 | \$ 73,361,775,034 | 100.0% | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: JP Morgan Research: Monthly Fixed Rate Special Servicing Analysis dated October 25, 2010

Loan Modification Trends (only \$7.8B out of \$74 B)

Very few principal write-downs at front end of modification strategy....how long will it last?



Source: JP Morgan Research: Monthly Fixed Rate Special Servicing Analysis dated October 25, 2010

Patterns of Loan Modifications by Special Servicers

To date, special servicers have focused on maturity date extensions (hoping to buy time for more favorable financing), and various measures of amortization / combined relief

Loan Modifications of Specially Serviced Loans- Historical


| Modification Type | # of Loans | % by Count | Aggregate Balance | % by Balance |
|------------------------------|------------|-------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| Mat. Date Ext. | 102 | 29.0% | \$ 2,576,793,595 | 33.0% |
| Other | 88 | 25.0% | \$ 2,305,041,104 | 29.5% |
| Combination | 100 | 28.4% | \$ 1,986,700,389 | 25.4% |
| Amort. Change | 34 | 9.7% | \$ 448,755,651 | 5.7% |
| Temp. Rate Reduction | 9 | 2.6% | \$ 213,753,030 | 2.7% |
| Payment Mod. | 7 | 2.0% | \$ 146,512,159 | 1.9% |
| Principal Write-off | 9 | 2.6% | \$ 112,252,398 | 1.4% |
| Pay. Mod. and Mat. Date Ext. | 2 | 0.6% | \$ 20,299,954 | 0.3% |
| Capitalization on Interest | 1 | 0.3% | \$ 4,440,101 | 0.1% |
| Total | 352 | 100% | \$ 7,814,548,381 | 100% |

Source: JP Morgan Research: Monthly Fixed Rate Special Servicing Analysis dated October 25, 2010

CMBS Modifications by Special Servicers

Collateral with positive DSC had been granted maturity date extensions, while challenged collateral has a combination of relief; however, limited principal write-downs to date.

Historical Modifications of Specially Serviced Loans by Modification Type and Special Servicer



Source: JP Morgan Research: Monthly Fixed Rate Special Servicing Analysis dated October 25, 2010

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